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Abstract
Adversarial examples are inputs intentionally perturbed with the aim of forcing
a machine learning model to produce a wrong prediction, while the changes are
not easily detectable by a human. Although this topic has been intensively studied
in the image domain, classification tasks in the audio domain have received less
attention. In this paper we address the existence of universal perturbations for
speech command classification. We provide evidence that universal attacks can be
generated for speech command classification tasks, which are able to generalize
across different models to a significant extent. Additionally, a novel analytical
framework is proposed for the evaluation of universal perturbations under different
levels of universality, demonstrating that the feasibility of generating effective
perturbations decreases as the universality level increases. Finally, we propose
a more detailed and rigorous framework to measure the amount of distortion
introduced by the perturbations, demonstrating that the methods employed by
convention are not realistic in audio-based problems.
Keywords: Adversarial Examples, Deep Neural Networks, Speech Command Classification, Speech
Recognition
1 Introduction
The increasing applications of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in security-critical tasks, such as
self-driving cars [1][2] or voice controlled systems [3][4][5], require a high reliability on these
computational models. In [6], Szegedy et al. discovered that an attacker can fool a DNN with inputs
which are slightly but adversarially modified: adversarial examples. These inputs are perturbed
in such a way that the changes can not be detected by a human, while forcing a target model to
misclassify or predict a specific output with high probability. The existence of such attacks questioned
the reliability of DNNs in adversarial scenarios, and the reason for these vulnerabilities is still an
open question [7].
The study of adversarial examples has focused primarily on the image domain and computer vision
tasks [8], whereas domains such as text or audio have received much less attention. Bearing in mind
that the properties of adversarial examples are not well understood yet, studying the effect of these
attacks in domains other than image-based tasks can provide very useful insights about the general
properties of adversarial examples.
Due to the relevance of the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial examples, in this paper we investigate
some of the properties that are well known in image domain tasks, but, to the best of our knowledge,
have not been studied yet in the audio domain. In particular, although methods that generate universal
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adversarial perturbations in the image domain have been proposed [9][10][11], no such algorithms
have been reported for many other tasks, such as speech classification in the audio domain. Thus,
a better understanding of universal adversarial examples in different domains may provide useful
insights into this property.
The contributions of our work are the following: 1) we introduce a novel analytical framework for
studying the existence of universal adversarial perturbations, 2) we provide evidence for the first
time that universal perturbations can be generated in speech command classification tasks, and 3) we
propose a more rigorous approach to evaluate the amount of distortion of the adversarial attacks in the
audio domain, showing that the approaches used by convention are not realistic for audio problems.
To facilitate future research, we made our code publicly available, along with the models and dataset
used in this paper.1
While working on this paper, we were aware of research done by Neekhara et al. [12] and Abdoli
et al. [13] which also addresses the generation of audio universal adversarial examples. There are
important differences between these works and our contributions (discussed in Section 3.2).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the main
concepts related to adversarial examples, as well as a novel taxonomy of universal adversarial
perturbations. Section 3 provides an overview of the state-of-the-art in audio adversarial attacks, and
Section 4 describes previous attack algorithms used as the basis for our approach. Section 5 presents
the selected dataset and models. The methodology used to craft audio universal perturbations is
introduced in Section 6, and the experimental results are discussed in Section 7, focusing on different
levels of the proposed taxonomy. Section 8 proposes a novel analytical framework for measuring the
distortion introduced by audio perturbations. Section 9 concludes this paper and identifies lines for
future research.
2 Notation and assumptions
In this section we introduce the notation and present a number of assumptions used to derive our
results.
Task We address adversarial perturbations in the audio domain for the particular problem of voice
command classification. Specifically, the task of classifying an audio waveform among a finite set
of possible (and previously defined) labels. We will assume audio waveforms of fixed lengths and
composed of values in a bounded range.
Classification model We will define a classification model f as a function f : X → Y , where
X ⊆ Rd represents the d dimensional input space of audio waveforms, and Y the set of possible
output labels, where yi ∈ {y1 . . . yk} represents the i-th label (commonly words or commands).
We will assume an end-to-end differentiable classification process, from which all the information
will be available, so that the gradients of the model’s output can be computed with respect to the
input audio waveform.
Adversarial example An adversarial example x′ is defined as x′ = x+ v, where x represents the
original (clean) input, and v ∈ Rd represents the adversarial perturbation. We assume that the original
input x must be a sample correctly classified by the model, and f(x′) 6= f(x). This restriction
ensures that the perturbation is actually fooling the model. In addition, the perturbation will be
measured by a distortion metric ϕ(x, x′)→ R, and will be restricted by a maximum threshold , so
that ϕ(x, x′) ≤ . This assumption tries to ensure that x′ is as similar as possible to x.
Given a clean input sample x and a target class t 6= f(x), a targeted adversarial example consists of a
perturbed sample x′ = x+ v which satisfies f(x′) = t. In contrast, untargeted adversarial examples
only require the output label to not be the same as the original one, that is, f(x′) 6= f(x).
Individual adversarial examples are based on unique perturbations, crafted specifically to be applied
to one particular input sample, so the same perturbation is not expected to work with a different input.
In contrast, universal adversarial examples are perturbations that can be applied to any clean input
1https://github.com/vadel/AudioUniversalPerturbations
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sample, that is, perturbations which are able to fool the model independently of the input. In this
work we will consider three different types of universal adversarial perturbations, according to the
number of classes for which it is expected to work:
• Level 1 - Single-class universal perturbations: perturbations expected to fool the target
model only for inputs of one particular class.
• Level 2 - Multiple-class universal perturbations: perturbations expected to fool target model
only for a particular subset of N classes, with 1 < N < k.
• Level 3 - Fully universal perturbations: perturbations expected to fool a target model for
every possible input, with complete independence of the original class.
Notice that the three levels are particular cases of an abstract type ofN -class adversarial perturbations,
where 1 ≤ N ≤ k. However, for the sake of clarity we use this separation in levels to develop our
experiments and analysis.
3 State of the art
3.1 Previous attacks in the audio domain
The main difficulty of crafting adversarial examples in the audio domain is that, unlike the image
domain, gradient-based methods are not directly applicable. This is due to the non-differentiability of
the Mel-Frequency Cepstrum (MFC) transformation [14], a widely-used feature extraction process
for speech recognition tasks, which is considered a standard component of speech recognition models.
In addition, many error metrics employed in audio domain tasks are non-differentiable as well, such
as Word Error Rate (WER) or Character Error Rate (CER), preventing the use of gradient-based
attack methods [15][16].
In [15], Cisse et al. introduced Houdini, a surrogate differentiable loss function which allows the
use of gradient-based optimization methods in domains in which the task loss function is non-
differentiable, which is the case of automatic speech recognition. They were able to generate both
targeted and untargeted attacks against a model based on the architecture of DeepSpeech2 [17].
However, they were able to construct audio adversarial examples targeting only phonetically similar
phrases. In addition, they proved the transferability of their attacks in a black-box scenario by fooling
the Google Voice application with the adversarial examples generated for their local model.
As in [15], in [18] Carlini et al. achieved targeted and untargeted attacks against DeepSpeech [19]
(Mozilla’s implementation [20]) in automatic speech recognition, using an optimization approach. In
comparison to [15], they achieved more powerful targeted attacks, being able to obtain any output
phrase, whether phonetically similar or not, as well as hiding speech from being transcribed or forcing
music to be transcribed as speech.
Finally, in [21] Alzantot et al. avoid the gradient based optimization by using genetic algorithms
to craft adversarial examples against speech command classification tasks, using the same model
structure and dataset used in this paper. Their method allowed them to generate adversarial examples
in a black box scenario by just adding noise to the 8 least-significant bits in 16 bits-per-sample audio
files.
All these works are based on individual adversarial attacks in the audio domain. In contrast, in this
paper we demonstrate the existence of universal adversarial perturbations, that is, a single perturbation
which is able to fool a target model for any input audio, which is a more general and complex attack
approach.
3.2 Universal adversarial examples
In [9], a universal adversarial perturbation v is crafted by sampling a subset of input instances X ,
iteratively computing the minimal local perturbation 4vi that sends each instance xi ∈ X to the
decision boundary of the model, and then adding this local perturbation to v. The method is described
in more detail in Section 4.
Only recently, the existence of universal adversarial perturbations in the audio domain for the task
of speech transcription has been addressed [12]. This task can be formalized as a mapping from a
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sequence of L audio frames from the input space X to a sequence of characters from the space Y ,
typically composed of a-z, space and an empty-character : f : XL → Y L. In particular, the task
addressed in [12] is the generation of a universal perturbation v capable of producing an error rate
E(f(x), f(x+ v)) above a certain threshold t for any input sample x. The metric E(x, y) used to
compute the produced error rate is a normalized Levenshtein distance [22], that is, the percentage of
edited characters using character removal, insertion or substitution operations. The approach used to
generate the universal perturbations is the same as that proposed in [9].
It is worth noting that speech command recognition from a predefined set of commands, the task
addressed in this paper, has particular characteristics which are different to speech transcription.
The main difference in the approach used to fool speech transcription models and speech command
classification models might be the fact that, in transcription, there is an exponentially larger number
of possibilities to increase the error rate. On the contrary, in speech command classification, the
whole signal is mapped to a single prediction, so that the possible outputs of the model are much
more limited. The differences between these tasks imply that the feasibility of generating universal
perturbations in one of them does not necessarily imply the same degree of feasibility in the other.
Similarly, the existence of universal perturbations for the sound classification task has been addressed
recently in [13]. As in the previous case, this task is considerably different to the speech command
classification task, as no specific component for speech treatment is involved.
Furthermore, although these two works on audio universal perturbations make use of the same
general approach that we employ to generate the attacks, they replace the method with which local
perturbations are computed. In the original algorithm, introduced for the image domain, Deepfool
[23] is used to construct the individual perturbations, which is based on pushing an input sample to
the closest decision boundary. In [12], an Iterative Gradient Sign Method [24] is employed, due to the
non-tractability of Deepfool in speech transcription tasks, in which there exists decision boundaries
for each audio frame across the time axis. In [13], Deepfool is replaced by the Decoupled Direction
and Norm attack [25]. On the contrary, we maintain the same algorithm proposed in the original
approach, and introduce the required modifications for the method to work in the audio domain.
Finally, we propose more rigorous standards to measure the amount of distortion introduced by the
perturbations, demonstrating that the approaches employed by convention in previous works are not
realistic in audio-based problems.
4 Methods for generating adversarial perturbations
To generate universal perturbations, in this paper we adapt the algorithm proposed by Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [9] for the image classification task (hereinafter referred to as UAP algorithm) to the
audio domain. This method relies on Deepfool [23], a state-of-the-art algorithm to generate individual
attacks. Therefore, in this section we briefly explain the main characteristics of both algorithms.
4.1 Deepfool
Deepfool [23] is an efficient greedy algorithm to generate untargeted individual adversarial examples,
which iteratively approximates a perturbation that sends a sample x to the decision boundary of the
model. Let x0 be an input of class t, f a target classifier, and fj the output logits of f corresponding
to the class j. The region of spaceR in which f predicts t is defined as:
R =
k⋂
j=1
{x : ft(x) ≥ fj(x)} (1)
For general multiclass classifiers, at iteration i, the algorithm approximates the region R by a
polyhedron R˜i:
R˜i =
k⋂
j=1
{x : fj(xi)− ft(xi) +5fj(xi)>x−5ft(xi)>x ≤ 0} (2)
Thus, the distance between xi and the boundaries of the regionR is approximated by the distance
between xi and R˜i. Being f ′j = fj(xi)− ft(xi) and w′j = 5fj(xi)−5ft(xi), the class l 6= t for
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whose region is closest to xi is determined in the following way:2
l = argmin
j 6=t
|f ′j |
||w′j ||2
(3)
Finally, xi is updated by adding the following perturbation:
xi+1 ← xi + (1 + ) |f
′
l |
||w′l||22
w′l, (4)
being  ∈ R+ an overshoot parameter, used to increase the magnitude of the perturbation in order
to surpass the decision boundary and reach a different decision region, fooling the model. This
process is repeated until the perturbation changes the predicted class of f , that is, until the condition
argmaxk fk(xi) 6= t is satisfied.
4.2 UAP algorithm
In [9], an algorithm to find untargeted adversarial perturbations in the image domain is presented
(hereinafter referred to as UAP), based on constructing a universal perturbation v by aggregating
individual perturbations generated using Deepfool. We will use this algorithm as a basis for our
proposal.
Given a collection of input samples X , the algorithm iteratively computes the minimun local pertur-
bation4vi that sends the image to the decision boundary of the model
4vi ← argmin
r
||r||2 s.t. f(xi + v + r) 6= f(xi) (5)
and then adds this local perturbation to v. In order to ensure that the norm of the perturbation is
restricted ||v||p < ξ, after each modification, v is projected on the `p ball of radius ξ and centered at
0, using the following projection operator:
Pp,ξ(v) = argmin
v′
||v − v′||2 subject to ||v′||p ≤ ξ (6)
Thus, at each iteration, the update rule of v is defined as:
v ← Pp,ξ(v +4vi) (7)
Once all the samples from X have been processed, the fooling rate of the resulting perturbation v is
computed against X . This process is repeated until the empirical fooling rate of v with respect to f
on the set X is above a specified threshold 1− α:
Px∈X( f(x) 6= f(x+ v) ) > 1− α (8)
5 Speech Command Classification
The speech command classification problem consists of assigning a class to a given audio from a
predefined set of k classes. In order to introduce and validate the proposed approaches, we will use
the Speech Command Dataset [26], which consists of a set of WAV audio files of 30 different spoken
commands. The duration of all the files is fixed to 1 second, and the sample-rate is 16kHz in all
the samples, so that each audio waveform is composed of 16000 values, in the range [−215, 215].
The original dataset contains samples of 30 different labels. We will use a subset of ten classes,
the standard labels selected in previous publications [21][26]: "Yes", "No", "Up", "Down", "Left",
"Right", "On", "Off", "Stop", and "Go". In addition to this set, we will consider two special classes:
"Unknown" (a command different to the ones specified before) and "Silence" (no speech detected).
The target model that will be used to generate the adversarial examples is based on the CNN
architecture described in [27]. This model takes as input a single WAV audio file (with a sample rate
of 16kHz) and transforms the signal from the time domain to the frequency domain, from which a
set of MFCC features are extracted for different time intervals. This results in a two dimensional
channel, which is fed into the following topology: two convolutional layers with a rectified linear unit
(ReLU) activation function, a fully-connected layer and a final softmax layer. The implementation
has been built on the code provided in [18] and [28], available from 3 and 4 respectively. The model
2The `p norm used to measure the perturbations can be extended for any p ∈ [1,∞).
3https://github.com/carlini/audio_adversarial_examples
4https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/tree/master/tensorflow/examples/speech_
commands
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Class Target Model A Target Model B
Silence 99.51 56.61
Unknown 66.42 71.08
Yes 94.03 91.17
No 74.57 82.47
Up 92.00 91.76
Down 80.79 79.31
Left 89.81 93.45
Right 88.64 90.66
On 87.12 87.63
Off 81.59 82.09
Stop 93.67 90.99
Go 77.36 72.14
Table 1: Initial accuracy per class of the target models
has been trained using the second version of the Speech Command Dataset [26], achieving a Top-One
Accuracy of 85.5% in the respective test dataset5.
To analyze the effectiveness of the adversarial perturbations in a model other than the one used to
generate them, we will use the pretrained speech recognition model available at 6. Although this
model has the same architecture as the one used to generate the attacks, it has different parameters
and is based on a different computation of the MFCC features. This model achieves a Top-One
accuracy of 82.5% on the same test dataset as Target Model A. We verified that there exist important
differences between the predictions given by the models, as shown in Table 1, in which the initial
accuracy of each model is computed per class. In particular, the class Silence obtains the highest
accuracy in Target Model A but the lowest in Target Model B.
6 Methodology: Hill Climbing Reformulation of Universal Adversarial
Perturbations
To generate universal perturbations, we use Algorithm 1 (hereinafter referred to as UAP-HC), which
is a reformulation of the UAP algorithm proposed for images [9], adapting it to the audio domain. An
additional change is incorporated to the algorithm: the perturbation is updated in a Hill-Climbing
fashion only if the update improves the global fooling rate of v, which is determined by the ratio of
fooled samples of X when applying a perturbation (line 12). The change was motivated because,
after an initial experimentation, the obtained results revealed that updating the universal perturbation
v with every new local perturbation 4vi (assuming that f(xi) = f(xi + v) 6= f(xi + v +4vi),
being xi the input sample for which4vi is crafted) led to a highly unstable evolution of the fooling
rate. This modification may not be required for other audio tasks, since in the research reported in
[12] and [13] the update rule is maintained without changes.
Regarding the parameters of the algorithm, the universal perturbation is bounded by the `2 norm,
with a threshold value of ξ = 0.1. In addition, the maximum number of iterations allowed for the
Deepfool algorithm is set to 100. The overshoot parameter of the Deepfool algorithm is set to 0.1.7
Finally, the fooling rate threshold of UAP-HC is set to 0.9 (α = 0.1), and the algorithm is restricted
to 5 iterations, that is, 5 complete passes through the entire set X .
The effectiveness of the perturbation in both the subset of samples used to craft the perturbation
(training set) and the subset used to measure its effectiveness on unseen samples (validation set) is
computed as the percentage of originally correctly classified samples for which the prediction of the
model changes after the adversarial attack. We will refer to this metric as fooling ratio (FR) [9].
In all the experiments, the set used to craft the perturbations is composed of N samples randomly
selected from the same training dataset used to train our target model (without replacement). In all
the cases, 5 different trials are made, using different samples of the training set, and the results are
5http://download.tensorflow.org/data/speech_commands_streaming_test_v0.02.tar.gz
6http://download.tensorflow.org/models/speech_commands_v0.02.zip
7The parameters of the Deepfool algorithm were selected after a preliminary experiment on individual
adversarial examples. The selected parameters managed to fool the model for 99.9% of the inputs that we
evaluated.
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Algorithm 1 UAP-HC
Input: A classification model f , a set of input samples X , a projection operator Pp,ξ and a fooling
rate threshold α
Output: A universal perturbation v
1: v ← initialize with zeros
2: foolingRate← 0
3: while foolingRate < 1− α do
4: for xi ∈ X do
5: Check that xi is not already fooled by v
6: if f(xi) 6= f(xi + v) then
7: Compute local perturbation using Deepfool
8: 4vi ← deepfool(xi)
9: Update v only if adding4vi increases the global fooling rate.
10: v′ ← Pp,ξ(v +4vi)
11: foolingRate′ ← Px∈X( f(x) 6= f(x+ v′) )
12: if foolingRate < foolingRate′ then
13: v ← v′
14: foolingRate← foolingRate′
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
18: end while
reported for the perturbation that maximizes the fooling ratio on the training set. The validation set is
the one used to test the initial accuracies of the target models in Section 5.
Finally, following the approach employed in previous works on adversarial examples in speech related
tasks [12][18], the relative loudness of the adversarial perturbation v with respect to an audio sample
x is measured according to the following metrics, in Decibels (dB): dBx(v) = dB(v) − dB(x),
where dB(x) = maxi 20 · log10(|xi|). As the loudness of the perturbation should be lower than
the loudness of the original signal, the difference is expected to be below zero. A distortion level
of -32dB is established as the maximum acceptable distortion, which roughly corresponds to the
difference between ambient noise in a quiet room and a person talking [18][29]. In our results, we
report the mean relative loudness on the validation set to measure the distortion produced by the
universal perturbation generated.
7 Results
7.1 Level 1 perturbations
We initially focused on the lowest universality level according to the taxonomy introduced, in which
we attempt to generate a single perturbation which is able to fool any input of one particular class. This
analysis may highlight the robustness or weakness of different classes against universal perturbations.
The fooling ratio in both training and validation sets and the mean distortion level of the perturbations
are presented in Table 2 for each class. According to the results, the effectiveness of the algorithm
is remarkably high, also requiring a considerably low amount of distortion, far below the threshold
of -32dB except for class silence8. For 7 out of 12 classes the best perturbation fools at least 70%
of the samples in the validation set, and for 10 out of 12 classes it fools at least 60%. Clearly,
generating universal perturbations is more difficult in some classes than in others, since the fooling
ratios obtained are of a considerably different magnitude. Although some of the classes obtain fooling
ratios above 80%, as is the case of no, others such as silence, left or stop are below 62%. In particular,
in the case of the class silence, the fooling ratio is below 25% in both training and validation sets.
8This effect on class silence is due to the fact that, due to the nature of the samples corresponding to that
class, their loudness level is lower than for the rest of classes.
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Class FR% Target Model A FR% Target Model B Mean dBTrain Valid Train Valid
Silence 23.80 19.46 12.96 12.55 -27.26
Unknown 72.70 73.06 21.30 31.38 -39.64
Yes 74.50 74.36 62.58 67.02 -41.72
No 86.50 83.77 4.38 7.19 -45.04
Up 84.20 75.45 9.17 7.95 -49.15
Down 71.50 65.55 14.15 12.73 -41.07
Left 52.30 49.73 13.40 17.66 -38.43
Right 68.70 63.82 12.29 15.04 -43.48
On 76.00 75.65 7.55 9.22 -42.75
Off 80.10 73.48 26.81 37.58 -43.73
Stop 61.40 61.82 19.77 25.40 -44.65
Go 87.80 80.06 29.78 32.41 -42.62
Table 2: Results obtained in Level 1 universal perturbations
7.2 Level 2 perturbations
As explained in Section 2, Level 2 universal perturbations attempt to create a single perturbation
which is able to fool all the inputs of a particular subset of classes. Their study allows us to investigate
how the difficulty of the problem changes among different subsets of classes, helping to identify
those more vulnerable to universal perturbations. It also opens the question of whether Level 2
perturbations are less or more effective than Level 3 perturbations. Such insights could be used in
future research as a basis to study different properties of universal attacks and to obtain a better
understanding of these vulnerabilities.
The experimentation initially focuses on subsets of two classes. For illustration purposes, we selected
a reduced and diverse set of pairs in terms of the phonetic similarity and transition probabilities
between classes. The following pairs are considered: no-go, up-off, yes-left, unknown-stop, silence-
unknown, and no-up. The training set is composed of 500 samples per class, forming a total of 1000
training samples.
Results are shown in Table 3. For each pair of classes, the fooling ratio has been computed considering
the audio samples of the two classes involved (Total) as well as individually in each class (C1 and C2).
The mean distortion levels of the perturbations are also displayed in the table, computed from the
validation set. According to the results, for the pairs no-go, up-off and no-up we obtained remarkably
high fooling ratios, being also the most balanced pairs regarding the values obtained at each class.
On the contrary, for the remaining pairs we obtained a final fooling ratio below 50%, being also
highly unbalanced on the ratios per class, with the exception of the pair unknown-stop, in which the
difference between both classes is approximately 13% in the training set and approximately 5% in
the validation set.
Pair
FR% - Target Model A FR% - Target Model B
Mean dBTrain Valid Train Valid
Total C1 C2 Total C1 C2 Total C1 C2 Total C1 C2
C1: no
C2: go 71.20 68.80 73.60 68.35 72.52 64.31 41.36 37.50 45.52 49.04 47.90 50.34 -46.37
C1: up
C2: off 67.50 70.40 64.00 62.03 62.40 61.58 28.14 31.70 24.69 31.94 34.10 29.39 -45.31
C1: yes
C2: left 36.90 73.80 0.00 36.78 71.32 0.00 29.12 58.79 0.00 32.20 64.60 0.00 -38.83
C1: unk.
C2: stop 48.90 55.20 42.60 47.41 50.55 45.19 15.21 10.57 19.20 21.54 16.90 25.13 -41.16
C1: silence
C2: unk. 43.30 19.40 67.20 35.60 16.75 63.84 27.56 24.65 29.63 32.25 21.65 40.69 -36.32
C1: no
C2: up 70.90 71.60 70.20 65.95 70.86 62.15 7.86 3.97 11.79 9.12 6.89 11.03 -42.04
Table 3: Results obtained in Level 2 Universal Perturbations
8
7.3 Level 3 perturbations
Level 3 universal perturbations comprise the most general level of universality, in which we attempt
to create a single input agnostic perturbation which is able to fool any possible input. This particular
level is the only one investigated in all previous works on universal adversarial examples.
Results for Level 3 perturbations are shown in Table 4. Comparing the fooling ratio achieved in each
class, it can be seen that the perturbation effectively fools a considerable percentage of samples in the
majority of the classes. In particular, in 2 out of 12 classes the fooling ratio is at least 70% in the
training set, and for 8 out of 12 classes at least 60%. In the validation set, the fooling ratio is at least
60% for 6 classes. As for previous levels, the mean distortion is below -32dB in all the cases except
for the class silence.
However, the total fooling ratio is reduced because of the low results obtained in classes silence and
left, achieving a total final fooling ratio near 50% in both training and validation sets. Although
room for improvement exists regarding the effectiveness of the perturbations, it is noteworthy that
the attacks generated imply a noticeable drop of the accuracy of the model, of approximately 50%
in both sets. Furthermore, the high fooling rates obtained in the majority of the classes proves the
existence of universal perturbations in speech command classification.
Class FR% Target Model A FR% Target Model B Mean dBTrain Valid Train Valid
Silence 26.00 18.72 36.07 35.50 -23.88
Unknown 62.00 61.62 44.30 49.31 -36.66
Yes 62.00 66.24 63.33 64.14 -37.56
No 61.00 66.23 44.21 51.20 -36.74
Up 70.00 61.89 52.08 50.26 -38.18
Down 52.00 44.82 22.58 15.53 -37.97
Left 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 -37.60
Right 60.00 55.84 35.05 38.99 -37.58
On 60.00 57.39 26.88 28.24 -36.42
Off 73.00 68.60 43.16 48.48 -38.27
Stop 45.00 43.38 29.17 33.42 -38.25
Go 60.00 63.34 44.57 51.72 -38.01
Total 52.58 46.64 36.53 38.70 -36.43
Table 4: Results obtained in Level 3 Universal Perturbations
7.4 Transferability
The transferability levels of the generated universal perturbations is described in Tables 2, 3 and 4,
for Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 universal perturbations respectively. Similarly to the original target
model, the effectiveness of the perturbations is considerably higher for some classes or subsets of
classes than for others. In Level 1 perturbations, for 4 out of 12 classes the fooling ratio is above
30% in the validation set. In Level 2 perturbations, for 4 out of 6 pairs of classes the fooling ratio is
above 30%. Finally, for Level 3 perturbations, although the total fooling ratio in the validation set is
38.70%, for 4 out of 12 classes the fooling ratio is above 50%, and for 9 out of 12 classes above 30%.
As can be seen, the generalization of the perturbations across models is generally higher as the
universality level increases, which may reflect that, when a large number of classes are considered,
the perturbations are able to generalize better not only across classes, but also across target models.
7.5 Discussion
In this section we provide evidence that universal adversarial examples can be created for speech
command classification models, although room for improvement exists regarding the effectiveness
of the attacks. In addition, although the effectiveness of the perturbations clearly decreases when
they are transfered to a new target model, the results indicate that they are transferable to a significant
extent.
The analysis carried out for different levels of universality revealed some interesting insights about
universal perturbations in this domain: 1) it is considerably easier to create perturbations for some
subsets of classes than for others, 2) while generating Level 1 universal perturbations is considerably
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more feasible than Level 2 or Level 3 perturbations, generating Level 3 perturbations is not necessarily
more difficult than Level 2 perturbations and 3) the transferability of the attacks increases as the
universality level increases. All these conclusions could be used as a basis to better study the
robustness of the model against adversarial attacks or to provide a theoretical explanation of universal
perturbations.
8 Deeper evaluation of the amount of distortion
As previously explained, to measure the loudness of an audio signal x = {x1, ..., xd} of length d,
previous related works [12][18] make use of the maximum decibel level of the signal. We have shown
in Section 7 that, under this criterion, our perturbations were far below the threshold of -32dB, and
therefore, assumed to be quasi-imperceptible according to the standards established by convention.
The drawback of considering only the maximum decibel level of the signals to compute the distortion
is that this metric can be highly sensitive to peaks in the intensity of the audio, which may lead to
results that do not adequately represent the overall loudness level of the audio. To obtain a more
accurate and robust evaluation of adversarial examples, we propose using, in addition to this distortion
metric, another one based on the mean loudness of the signal:
dBmean(x) = 20 · log10
(
1
d
d∑
i=1
|xi|
)
(9)
As in the previous case, the distortion level of a signal v with respect to another reference signal x is
measured as:
dBx,mean(v) = dBmean(v)− dBmean(x). (10)
Besides, previous works compute the distortion between two signals by applying the metrics to
the entire signals. In order to provide a more detailed evaluation of the distortion, we propose
analyzing the perturbation for different parts of the signals independently, partitioned according to
the information they convey. In particular, we will consider two different parts in each audio signal:
the vocal part and the background part. As both parts are significantly different, and because the
distortion will be measured based on aggregated features of the audio signals, evaluating these metrics
in the entire signal could lead to misleading results. Thus, we will study the distortion in these two
parts independently, in order to obtain more informative results. To the best of our knowledge, a
similar type of analysis has not been previously reported in the related literature.
Being x = {x1...xd} an audio signal, the vocal part will be delimited by the continuous range [xa, xb]
containing 95% of the energy of the signal, that is,
∑b
j=a x
2
j∑d
i=1 x
2
i
≈ 0.95. Thus, we will assume that ranges
[x1, xa) ∪ (xb, xd] will be composed just of background noise. Figure 1 shows an audio signal in
which the vocal part has been delimited using this method. Notice that this partition is well suited for
single command audios in which it is assumed that the vocal part of the signal is contiguous.
Figure 1: Illustration of the identification of the vocal part in an audio signal (right) according to the
cumulative sum of its energy (left). Red vertical lines delimit the vocal part, and the red numbers
located at the top of each image indicate the percentage of energy located in each interval.
The amount of distortion computed using this approach is presented in Figure 2, represented for the
Level 3 universal perturbations. According to the results, the amount of distortion in the vocal part
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is acceptable for the great majority of the samples for the two metrics considered. However, the
distortion in the background part is above the threshold of −32dB for a considerably high proportion
of samples according to the metric dBx,mean(v), which indicates that the perturbation may be highly
detectable outside the vocal part. We encourage the reader to listen to some adversarial examples,
to empirically verify that the perturbations are actually detectable.9 These results strengthen our
proposal about the need to employ more rigorous approaches in order to measure and threshold the
distortion produced by the adversarial perturbations in a more representative way.
Figure 2: Distortion level of the generated Level 3 universal perturbations, evaluated in the validation
set using dBx,max(v) metric (top row) and dBx,mean(v) metric (bottom row). For each audio, the
distortion has been measured in the background part as well as in the vocal part, except for the class
silence, as it is only composed of background noise. Results are averaged for the 5 experiments
carried out.
9 Conclusions
In this work the feasibility of generating universal adversarial perturbations in the task of speech
command classification has been addressed. To deal with this question, we have introduced the
concept of N -class universality as a theoretical framework for the study of universal perturbations,
which is based on the number of target classes that the universal attack is designed to inhibit. This
framework has been used to determine the feasibility of generating universal perturbations according
to different levels of universality.
The reported results demonstrate that effective universal adversarial attacks can be generated for
speech command classification models, although improvement is needed in order to consider the
perturbations fully universal. The results also reflected that, although the effectiveness of the
perturbations was reduced in new target models, they were transferable across models to a significant
extent.
Regarding the evaluation of the detectability of the attacks, we have proposed the use of an experi-
mental framework to perform a deeper evaluation of the distortion in the audio domain, based on
measuring the distortion in different parts of the audio signals, partitioned according to the infor-
mation they convey. We have shown that, although the obtained distortion levels are acceptable
according to the standard evaluation approach employed by convention in previous works, under a
more rigorous evaluation, the perturbations were detectable outside the vocal parts corresponding
9https://vadel.github.io/audio_adversarial/UniversalPerturbations.html
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to the speech command. This fact should be addressed in future research to achieve less detectable
perturbations.
Overall, we have provided evidence that universal adversarial attacks can be generated for speech
command classification models, which supposes a serious concern regarding the reliability of speech-
based agents in practical scenarios.
The performed study also leaves a number of interesting open questions and future research lines.
First of all, the audio domain contains a number of properties that could be used to enhance the
universal perturbations, for example, the frequency domain. A wiser exploitation of such properties
may lead to more powerful attacks or produce less detectable perturbations. In addition, the reason of
the DNN vulnerabilities to adversarial examples is still an open question, although many different
hypotheses have been proposed [30][31][32]. An evaluation of those hypotheses in the studied
domain may be an interesting research line, in order to address their validity.
Finally, previous works on universal adversarial perturbations in the image domain revealed the
existence of a low dimensional subspace containing vectors with high attack capabilities [9][33].
Finding such subspaces in the audio domain would be an important discovery, which may provide
valuable insights from a theoretical point of view, as it may provide advantages regarding the
connection between different domains.
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